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LAWFUL SELF-DEFENSE TO TERRORISM
Mary Ellen O'Connell
On October 7,2001, the United States and the United Kingdom launched
operation Enduring Freedom. Enduring Freedom was a massive aerial and
land operation on the territory of Afghanistan in response to the September 11
terror attacks on the United States.' The two governments justified Enduring
Freedom as an exercise of lawful self-defense.2 This article examines the
elements of self-defense, applying them to Enduring Freedom. At the outset,
Enduring Freedom did indeed meet the conditions of lawful self-defense, but
later stages of the operation may have gone beyond the bounds of
proportionality. The article also looks at the alternatives to self-defense for
those cases that do not meet the threshold for all-out military action on the
territory of a foreign state.'
The right to take military action on the territory of another state is at the
core of a self-defense and why it is of concern to international society.
Governments have decided they cannot eliminate the right to use force in self-
defense in all cases.' Nevertheless, they have, through international law,
limited force in self-defense to the most exigent circumstances. Unless a state
has received United Nations Security Council authorization, it must meet four
conditions to engage in lawful self-defense: First, the defending state must be
the victim of a significant armed attack.' Second, the armed attack must be
either underway or the victim of an attack must have at least clear and
I. See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist
Camps; Bush Warns 'Taliban Will Pay a Price,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at Al. On October 7 the US
and UK had some military advisers on the ground in Afghanistan. The major part of the operation at the
start was from the air.
2. See infra note 9.
3. As will be discussed in Part V below, the United States does not, at the time of writing, have a
case for self-defense against Iran, Iraq, or North Korea, the three countries identified as the "axis of evil"
by President Bush in his State of the Union Address. See Edward Epstein, Bush's Tough Talk Singles Out
3 Rogue States, Phase II: Addressing the Broader Threat, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 31, 2002, at Al. See MARY
ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON
TERRORISM, The Myth of Pre-emptive Self-Defense, available at http://www.asil.org (last visited Oct. 13,
2002).
4. The U.N. Charter contains a broad prohibition on force with a narrow exception for self-defense
in the face of an armed attack. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
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convincing evidence that more attacks are planned.6 Third, the defending
state's target must be responsible for the significant armed attack in progress
or planned.7 Fourth, the force used by the defending state must be necessary
for the purpose of defense and it must be proportional to the injury
threatened.8
I. THE VICTIM OF SIGNIFICANT ARMED ATTACK
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter prohibit the
unauthorized use of force except in self-defense against an armed attack, and,
even then, only until the Security Council acts.9 Stated positively, "Art. 51
clearly licenses at least one kind of resort to force by an individual member
State: namely, the use of armed force to repel an armed attack."'" Any other
6. See infra notes 25-72 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
9. Article 2(4):
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, amended 24
U.S.T. 2225, T.I.A.S. 7739, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 14 [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members
in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51, 59 Stat. 1031. T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, amended 24. The United Kingdom
has joined with the U.S. in collective self-defense. The United States and United Kingdom appear to have
fulfilled the reporting requirement under Article 51 by sending letters to the Security Council on October 7.
3C LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 2001 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/946 (2001); LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 2001 FROM THE CHARGI D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE
UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/2001/947
(2001).
10. Bert V.A. R6ling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 3 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).
[Vol. 63:889
LAWFUL SELF-DEFENSE TO TERRORISM
use of armed force must either be authorized by the Security Council" or so
minor that it falls under a de minimis exception. 2
The International Court of Justice, in a case brought by Nicaragua against
the United States and decided in 1986," provides an authoritative
interpretation of the right of self-defense as it had evolved by the time of the
judgment. The Court explains the requirement for an armed attack and the
requirement for the armed attack to be significant before a state may use force
on the territory of another state in individual or collective self-defense.'4 The
Court places emphasis for its analysis on the United Nations General
Assembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression. 5 The Definition lists acts that
trigger the right of self-defense, when, as the Court emphasizes, the act is on
a significant scale. These include invasion of 'territory, bombardment of
territory, blockade of ports, attack on air, sea or land forces, and the "sending
... of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts
listed above, or its substantial involvement therein."' 6 On the other hand, the
Court found that the low-level shipments of weapons and supplies that were
11. A number of international law scholars support a right to intervene in humanitarian crises. As
of the time of writing, however, no government takes the official position that such humanitarian
intervention is a firmly established exception to the Articles 2(4)/51 paradigm. For evidence of the U.S.
government position, see Mary Ellen O'Connell. Authority to Intervene, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, PROCEEDINGS OF A JOINT MEETING OF THE AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 303, 304 (June 26-29, 2000). For a more detailed analysis of humanitarian intervention, see SIMON
CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? (2001).
12. The Definition of Aggression provides:
Article 2. The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
primafacie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with
the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not
be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned
or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
Definition ofAggression, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)
[hereinafter Definition of Aggression]. "The Consensus Definition of Aggression contains in Article 2 a
de minimus clause ... , and what is true of aggression is all the more valid in respect of armed attack."
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 117 (3d ed. 2001). See also Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 195 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
13. Nicaragua, supra note 12.
14. Nicaragua, supra note 12, at I[ 194-95, 211. Strictly, the Court, actually interpreted the
meaning of self-defense under customary international law rather than Article 51. It found no difference
between the two, however. For analyses of this and other issues in the case, see Terry D. Gill, Litigation
Strategy in the Nicaraguan Case at the International Court, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF
PERPLEXITY 197 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).
15. Nicaragua, supra note 12, at f 194-95, 211, citing Definition of Aggression, supra note 12.
16. Definition of Aggression, supra note 12, art. 3.
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being sent from Nicaragua to rebels fighting the government of El Salvador
did not amount to an armed attack on El Salvador that could trigger the right
of self-defense. 7 The Court stated affirmatively that it was unable to consider
that the "provision of arms to the opposition in another State constitutes an
armed attack on that State."' 8 Nor could the Court find that a "mere" border
incursion could trigger self-defense. 9
With regard to September 11, Security Council resolutions adopted in the
wake of the attacks refer to the right of self-defense. In particular, Resolution
1373 (September 28) reveals the Council's consensus as to self-defense and
terrorism shortly before Enduring Freedom was launched:
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and
1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of
the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania
on 1I September 2001, and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts ....
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by
the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001), Reaffirming the
need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts....'2
The operative part of the Resolution mandates economic sanctions to combat
terrorism. It does not authorize the use of armed force, nor does it explicitly
authorize the United States to use armed force in self-defense to the
September 11 attacks.2 Nevertheless, the Resolution does support the
conclusion that the September 11 attacks were significant enough to trigger
the right of self-defense, if the other conditions of legality are met.22 In
several subsequent resolutions relating to terrorism and the situation in
Afghanistan, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly
condemned Enduring Freedom as a violation of the Charter.23 Moreover, it is
quite clear that the Resolutions did not intend to displace self-defense by the
17. Nicaragua, supra note 12, at 1 195, 230. It is not entirely clear whether the Court intended to
say that providing weapons and other supplies to persons attacking a state could never amount to an attack
itself, or only whether the low level shipments proven in the Nicaragua case did not.
18. Nicaragua, supra note 12, at 230.
19. Id. at 194-95.




23. See G.A. Res. 56/88, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/88 (Jan. 24, 2002); U.N.
SCOR 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (2001); U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (2001).
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United States with measures by the Security Council.24 Therefore, we can
conclude that the first condition for lawful self-defense was met. The United
States was the victim of a significant armed attack.
11. TO DETER THE NEXT ATTACK
Armed force in self-defense must have defense as its object. Force in
self-defense must aim at stopping an attack in progress, defending against a
future attack once an attack has occurred, or ending an unlawful occupation.25
Lawful self-defense cannot be a mere act of punishment or revenge. Armed
force to "send a message" or to generally deter is unlawful.26 Armed counter-
attack must have the aim of more specific defense. Where a significant armed
attack has already occurred but is not on-going, the defending state must show
at least by clear and convincing evidence that future attacks are planned.27 In
the case where no actual attack has yet struck its intended target, the defending
state may act only where it has clear and convincing evidence of an incipient
attack--one that is underway, requiring an instant response.28
A use of force not aimed at specific defense could constitute an unlawful
armed reprisal if on a small scale or even an act of aggression if on a larger
scale. Reprisals are not considered measures of self-defense-they do not
repel on-going armed attacks or seek to dislodge an unlawful occupation.29
Force unrelated to an actual armed attack or force used long after an armed
24. Some scholars seem to believe that Resolution 1373, by mandating economic sanctions, obviates
the US/UK right to use force. They argue that the sanctions called for in 1373 are the measures the Council
has chosen to deal with the September 11 attacks per Article 51 's limitation on the right to use force "until
the U.N. Security Council can take steps necessary for international peace and security." See Michael
Mandel, Say What You Want, But This War is Illegal, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 9, 2001, at A21 (Letter to the
Editor). Resolution 1373 has no express terms to the effect that the Council believes it has foreclosed the
U.S. use of force in self-defense, nor have any members of the Security Council voting to adopt the
Resolution expressed such an interpretation. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 373, supra note 20.
25. Rdling, supra note 10, at 3. Reversing the consequences of an attack, such as ending an
occupation is also lawful self-defense. Note the example of Kuwait following Iraq's invasion and
occupation, described in Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The
U.N. 's Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453 (1991).
26. The ICJ required an armed attack prior to armed force in self-defense. Nicaragua, supra note
12, at i 194-95, 211.
27. See O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 8-10; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. OF
CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 19, 30 (2002).
28. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 8-10.
29. "Because of their nature reprisals come after the event and when the harm has already been
inflicted." STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 17-18 (1996).
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attack-absent a continuing wrong-is unlawful. The UN General Assembly
has resolved that armed countermeasures or reprisals are unlawful and that
states have a duty to refrain from them.3" The International Court of Justice
has indicated in both Nicaragua and Corfu Channel that reprisals are
unlawful.3
Where a state does intend to use force in self-defense, it need not in all
cases wait for the initial armed attack to actually strike its target. The
Caroline Doctrine describes the conditions under which defense may begin:
"[n]ecessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."32 This suggests that even
before the bullets are flying, self-defense may begin if the necessity is
overwhelming. Writers often provide the example of Israel in the 1967 war
as having engaged in lawful, anticipatory self-defense against Egypt. Israel
destroyed Egyptian fighter planes in formation for take-off. Subsequent
evidence suggests that Israel knew Egypt did not plan to attack Israel. If so,
Israel's attack was unlawful.3 But where one state is in the process of
launching an attack on another, self-defense may begin. There must be a plan
for the attack, and the plan must be in the course of implementation. Once
planes are in formation to implement a known plan of attack, a defending state
would be justified in launching a pre-emptive attack in self-defense.34
Unlike the case where no armed attack has yet occurred, the state, already
a victim, may use self-defense even if the next attacks are not yet underway.35
30. In the General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 1970,
"States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR,
6th Comm., 25th Sess., Annex, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
31. See Nicaragua, supra note 12, ati 191; see also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Ab.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,
108-09 (Apr. 9).
32. JOHN B. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY &
NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 91-96 (1992); OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 150-52 (2d ed. 1991).
33. See Le general Robin ne peuse pas que Nasser Voulait la guerre, LE MONDE, Feb. 19, 1968. See
also John Quigley. The United Nations Action Against Iraq: A Precedent for Israel's Arab Territories?,
2 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 195, 203-13 (1992). Dinstein indicates the same conclusion concerning the
strength of Israel's evidence prior to striking: "Hindsight knowledge, suggesting that-notwithstanding
the well-founded contemporaneous appraisal of events-the situation may have been less desperate than
it appeared, is immaterial." DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 173.
34. Further discussion of when self-defense may begin is beyond the scope of this article which
focuses on a case where an attack has already occurred. But see O'Connell, supra note 3.
35. The Security Council approved of self-defense in these circumstances following the September
II attacks. The Council indicated self-defense would be justified even at a time when no further attacks
were underway. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, supra note 20.
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The defending state need only show by clear and convincing evidence that
future attacks are planned.36 In many cases of self-defense, the facts of the
attack and the responsible party are evident for all the world to see. Iraq's
1990 invasion of Kuwait is a case in point. When a less obvious event occurs,
like the September 11 attacks, the state contemplating self-defense may have
to provide evidence that future attacks are pending.
International law has no generally-accepted law of evidence.37
Nonetheless, sufficient authority exists to support an argument that any state
engaging in self-defense in such circumstances must show by clear and
convincing evidence that future attacks are planned.38 Several international
courts and tribunals have addressed the point, as have scholars, and the United
States itself has consistently referred to "clear," "convincing" or "compelling"
evidence in such cases.39 The clear and convincing evidence standard is also
the best standard from a policy standpoint to promote the objectives of
international society in regulating the use of force between states, that
objective being to drastically limit the use of force.
Two binding decisions support the clear and convincing standard as a
general standard for international law. In an arbitration between the United
States and Canada where the United States claimed Canada was responsible
for environmental damage, the arbitrators found "no State has the right to use
or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury ... to the
territory of another... when the case is of serious consequence and the injury
is established by clear and convincing evidence."' Also, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights determined in the Velasquez Rodriquez case that
forced disappearance could be proven by less than evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt.4 Shelton reasons that clear and convincing evidence is the
generally appropriate standard where allegations against states are made of
systematic and grave violations of human rights.42 The European Court of
Human Rights has required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in torture cases,
but recently moved down from that standard in a forced disappearance case.43
36. See O'Connell, supra note 3, at 8-11; see also Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS,
VALUES, AND FUNCTIONS 142-62 (1990) and DINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 220-26.
37. O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, supra note 27, at 18.
38. For a more complete discussion of this issue of evidence, see id.
39. Id. at 18-21.
40. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941) (emphasis added).
41. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C), No. 4, at 1 127 (1988).
42. Dinah Shelton, Judicial Review ofStateAction by International Courts, 12FORDHAMINT'LL.J.
361 (1989).
43. Gobind Singh Sethi, Comment, The European Court of Human Rights' Jurisprudence on Issues
20021
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
The International Court of Justice (IC) has no established rules of
evidence." However, it has referenced evidence standards from time-to-time.
In Corfu Channel the court stated, "proof may be drawn from inferences of
fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt."'45 In Nicaragua
v. United States, however, where the issue of evidence was central to the case,
the ICJ referred only to the need for "direct proof. 4 6 The United States
declined to contest the case on the merits, but under the ICJ Statute, its failure
to appear did not entitle Nicaragua to a default judgment. Nicaragua still had
to put on a case "well founded in fact and law."47 The Court accepted most,
but not all, of Nicaragua's claims. It did not accept Nicaragua's arguments
that the United States was responsible for serious human rights abuses
committed by the Nicaraguan rebels known as the Contras.4" In the most
important finding for the purposes of this analysis, the Court decided that
"despite the heavy subsidies and other support provided to them by the United
States, there is no clear evidence of the United States having actually
exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras
as acting on its behalf."'49 Thus, state responsibility for non-state actors will
follow only if the state controls the actors, control being proven by "clear
evidence."
United States officials consistently refer to at least "convincing" or
"compelling" evidence when responding to terror attacks with armed force.5"
The United States bombed Libya in 1986 in response to the terror bombing of
a discotheque in Berlin.5 The Reagan Administration revealed evidence of
the source of the bombing and plans for future attacks."2 President Reagan
called the evidence of Libya's involvement in the Berlin bombing
"irrefutable" and referred to "solid evidence about other attacks Qaddafi has
planned against U.S. installations and diplomats, and even American
of Forced Disappearances, 3 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 29, 30-31 (2001).
44. Keith Highet, Evidence, the Court and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'LL. 1, 7-8 (1987)
(citing 2 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 580 (1965)).
45. Corfu Channel, supra note 3 1, at 27.
46. Nicaragua. supra note 12, at I l11.
47. STATUTE OF THE INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 53(2) (annexed to U.N. Charter, June 26,1945).
48. Nicaragua, supra note 12, at 1116.
49. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
50. O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, supra note 27, at 21-24.
51. Christopher Greenwood, Intenational Law and the United States'Air Operation AgainstLibya,
89 W. VA. L. REv. 933 (1987).
52. Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and
Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 549 (1999).
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tourists."53  Indeed, in revealing the evidence, the U.S.- compromised
intelligence sources much to the consternation of the CIA.54 The U.S. justified
the bombing as self-defense."
On June 26, 1993, the United States carried out an armed attack against
Iraq in retaliation for an alleged assassination attempt against former president
George Bush. 5  President Clinton said the evidence linking the Iraqi
government of Saddam Hussein to the plot was "compelling."57 At the United
Nations, then United States U.N. Representative Madeleine Albright justified
the attack as legitimate self-defense."
In 1998, trucks rigged with bombs blew up outside the United States
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killing more than 200 people.59 On
August 20, 1998, the United States launched bombing raids against the
training camps in Afghanistan of a wealthy Saudi named Osama bin Laden
and a factory in Khartoum, Sudan, also linked to bin Laden.' "The president
said the U.S. targets were a terrorist base in Afghanistan and a chemical
weapons facility in Sudan. 'We have convincing evidence these groups
played the key role in the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.... We
have compelling information that they were planning additional terrorist
attacks against our citizens and others."'' 61 Again, the United States reported
to the Security Council that the attacks had been in self-defense.62 In the days
that followed, however, several governments and arms control experts
questioned the evidence linking the factory to bin Laden and to the production
53. Lou Cannon, Reagan Acted Upon 'Irrefutable' Evidence, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at A01,
available at 1986 WL 2050378.
54. Comments of James Olsen, former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Chief of Counter-
Intelligence, remarks, Jan. 25, 2002, Mershon Center for the Study of International Security and Public
Policy, The Ohio State University.
55. John M. Goshko, Administration Acts on 'Self-Defense' Principle Espoused by Shultz, WASH.
POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at A20, available at 1986 WL 2050409.
56. Alan D. Surchin, Note, Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993
Bombing of Baghdad, 5 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L 457 (1995).
57. Associated Press, June 26, 1993, available at 1993 WL 4574208.
58. U.S. Explains Its Missile Attacko n Iraq to Security Council, AGENCE FR.-PRESs, June 27, 1993,
available at 1993 WL 10739350.
59. William Claiborne, Bombs at 2 U.S. Embassies in Africa Kill81; 8Americans Among the Dead,
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1998, at A01, available at WL 16548641; see also Pamela Constable, Russia, U.S.
Converge on Warnings to Taliban; Ex-Rivals Fear Afghan Support for Terrorists, WASH. POST, June 4,
2000, at A23, available at WL 19612609.
60. Clinton Orders Military Strikes, AP ONLINE, Aug. 20, 1998, available at 1998 WL 6712010.
61. Id.
62. Draft UN Resolution Calls for Sudan Fact-Finding Mission, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 28,
1998, at 1, available at 1998 WL 16608635.
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of chemical weapons.63 It became a case where international society judged
the evidence insufficient: it was not clear and convincing.
Several prominent scholars also support a clear and convincing standard.
In cases of force in response to terror, Greenwood refers to "sufficiently
convincing" and "convincing evidence."'  Lobel advocates "stringent"
evidence:
Given the potential for abuse of the right of national self-defense, international law must
require that a nation meet a clear and stringent evidentiary standard designed to assure
the world community that an ongoing terrorist attack is in fact occurring before the
attacked nation responds with force. Such a principle is the clear import of the
International Court of Justice's decision in Nicaragua v. United States.65
Henkin, as well, finds that international law "recognize[s] the exception of
self-defense in emergency, but limit[s it] to actual armed attack, which is
clear, unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open to misinterpretation
or fabrication. '
In addition to the views of scholars, judicial decisions, and the U.S.
position, as a matter of policy, the standard for self-defense should be at least
clear and convincing. The drafters of the Charter sought to "cut to a minimum
the unilateral use of force in international relations. 67 They aimed at nothing
less than finally freeing the world from the scourge of war. In the course of
their debates, they did finally concede to one explicit exception to the general
prohibition on force.68 In case the Security Council might not act in time,
states could undertake self-defense should they come under an armed attack.
Such defense could continue until the Security Council acted. The self-
defense exception was to be a very narrow one for extraordinary
circumstances. Because the Security Council failed to be a pro-active agency,
it has rarely come to the aid of a state suffering armed attack. Nevertheless,
the intent of the drafters was clear that the right to use force should be kept to
63. Terry Atlas & Ray Moseley, 'Smoking Gun'for Sudan Raid Now in Doubt, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28,
1998 at 1, available at 1998 WL 2890083.
64. Greenwood, supra note 51, at 935.
65. Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Jordan and
Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 547 (1999).
66. LouIs HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 142 (2d ed. 1979).
67. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY art. 51, 134 (Bruno Simma et al.
eds., 1994) (Randelzhofer).
68. At the San Francisco Conference to draft the Charter, "[t]here was a presumption against self-
help and even action in self-defence within Article 51 was made subject to control by the Security Council."
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275 (1963) and references
collected therein.
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a minimum.69 The rules of evidence can support the fulfillment of that intent
by requiring clear and convincing evidence before a state may invoke the
exception of self-defense. In domestic evidence law, certainly in the U.S., the
law will generally require a party wishing to invoke an exception to a rule to
do so by clear and convincing evidence. The same standard should apply to
international evidence law, for the same underlying reason.
In the case of Enduring Freedom, both the United States and United
Kingdom have argued that the September 11 attacks were part of a series of
attacks that began in 1993 on the United States. Both have argued that future
attacks in the same series were planned. The series began with the first attack
on the World Trade Center. It included the embassy bombings in Tanzania
and Kenya, and very likely included the attack on the USS Cole. Almost
immediately following the September 11 attacks, the United States and several
European states apprehended individuals who indicated more attacks were
planned.7" The evidence was presented to NATO members and was called
"compelling."'" Thus, based on publicly available material, the United States
and United Kingdom appeared to have clear and convincing evidence that the
U.S. faced on-going attacks. Subsequent to the launch of Enduring Freedom,
the United States found documentary evidence in Afghanistan confirming that
more attacks in the series were indeed being planned.72
IL. BY THE RESPONSIBLE STATE
Establishing the need for taking defensive action can only justify fighting
on the territory of another state if that state is responsible for the on-going
attacks. It may well be that in a world of non-state actors, a group launching
significant, on-going armed attacks has no link to a state and so no state can
be the target of defensive counter-attack. In those cases, measures other than
self-defense on the territory of a state must be taken by the victim.
Alternatives to self-defense are discussed in Part V below. This section
69. Id.
70. Peter Finn, Germans Identify More Terror Suspects; Police Watch Five People Who May Have
Provided Support to Sept. 11 Hijackers, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2001, at A21, available at 2001 WL
30326105.
71. William Drozdiak & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, NATO: U.S. Evidence on Bin Laden
"Compelling"; Allies Give Unconditional Support for Retaliatory Strikes; Taliban Official Asks to see
Proof, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28361574.
72. Recovered al-Qaeda Documents Reveal Plansfor Other TerrorAttacks: Official, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Feb. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2330114.
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addresses situations in which a state is held responsible under international
law, and, thus, when the defending state may take the fight to its territory.
In many cases, responsibility is obvious. In others, the defending state
may need to provide evidence that the territorial state is responsible for the
unlawful acts. Where a case must be made, the defending state must have
clear and convincing evidence, based on the same analysis provided above.
Some clandestine terror attacks are carried out by government agents, such as
the case of the Berlin disco bombing by Libya in 1986. 7" State responsibility
was established once clear and convincing evidence was adduced that the
agents of that state were involved.74 A state will also be responsible where it
sends persons to carry out the attack even if those persons are not the state's
officials or agents,75 and it will be responsible where it has developed
sufficiently close links with the group even if it does not control them.76 A
recent case at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia posits that
a "role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the
military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing
operational support to that group" results in responsibility for the group.77
In other cases, with regard to such groups as those operating out of
Lebanon against Israel78 or the Kurdish groups carrying out attacks in Turkey
and Iran from bases in Iraq,79 the territorial state is not responsible for the acts
themselves because it cannot control the acts of groups on its territory. In the
73. Christiane Wirtz, Eine Discotehk wiirde zum Kriegsschauplatz, Berliner Landgericht;
Hochrangig Angehlirige des libyschen Geheimdienstes planten den Anschlag, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG,
Nov. 14, 2001, at 9. And it was confirmed by a Scottish Court that the bombing of an American passenger
jet following the disco bombing was also carried out by Libyan agents. Allan Nacheman, Libyan Agent
Guilty, Tripoli Blamed at Lockerbie Bombing Trial, AGENCE-FR. PRESSE, Jan. 31, 2001, 2001
WL32222591.
74. For the most up-to-date statement of this law, see Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/56/83 (2002) [hereinafter
Responsibility of States].
75. See Definition ofAggression, supra note 12, art. 3(g): "The sending by or on behalf of a State
of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein."
76. The ICJ in Nicaragua found that acts of the Contra rebels were not attributable to the United
States because the evidence did not show that the United States exercised "effective control" over the
Contras. Nicaragua, supra note 12, at H 114-16.
77. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-I-T, 137 (May 7, 1997).
78. See D. Brian Hufford & Robert Malley, The War in Lebanon: The Waxing and Waning of
International Norms, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 144,
176-80 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988).
79. Michael Bothe & Torsten Lohmann, Der t&kische Einmarsch in Nordirak, SZVER 441 (April
1995); Iran Claims Right of Self-Defense in Attacking Rebel Kurds, AGENCE-FR. PRESSE, July 30, 1996,
1996 WL3897476.
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case of Lebanon, the government was paralyzed because of a civil war; in the
case of the Kurds, Iraq is prohibited by the UN from controlling the northern
sector of its country, the area where the Kurds in question operate.80 In these
cases, too, defense may be taken to the territory of the failed or impotent state.
However, defense should aim at the responsible group and not at the
government or the factions struggling for control of the state. Finally, in some
cases a state becomes responsible when it adopts the acts of a terror group
after the fact.8
In the case of Enduring Freedom, the Taliban, Afghanistan's de facto
government, developed such close links to the known terrorist organization al
Qaeda that it became responsible for the acts of al Qaeda. With that
responsibility came the right of the United States and United Kingdom to take
the fight to Afghanistan. U.K. lawyers understood the facts they needed to
show: the U.K.'s paper of 4 October carefully detailed links between al
Qaeda and the Taliban. 2
The British paper states most significantly, that:
11. In 1996 Osama Bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan. He established a close
relationship with Mullah Omar, and threw his support behind the Taliban. Osama
Bin Laden and the Taliban regime have a close alliance on which both depend for
their continued existence. They also share the same religious values and vision.
12. Osama bin Laden has provided the Taliban regime with troops, arms and money
to fight the Northern Alliance. He is closely involved with Taliban military
training, planning and operations. He has representatives in the Taliban military
command structure. He has also given infrastructure assistance and humanitarian
aid. Forces under the control of Osama bin Laden have fought alongside the
Taliban in the civil war in Afghanistan.
13. Omar has provided bin Laden with a safe haven in which to operate, and has
allowed him to establish terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. They jointly
exploit the Afghan drugs trade. In return for active al-Qaida support, the Taliban
allow al-Qaida to operate freely, including planning, training and preparing for
terrorist activity. In addition the Taliban provide security for the stockpiles of
drugs.
83
80. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE 104 (2000).
81. In Hostages, the ICJ found Iran was responsible for the hostage-taking at the United States
Embassy because of the "failure on the part of the Iranian authorities to oppose the armed attack by
militants. .. [and] the almost immediate endorsement by those authorities of the situation thus created."
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, at 42 (May
24).
82. British Release Evidence Against bin Laden, www.salon.com/news... /2001/10/04/
british.evidence/print.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001) (on file with author).
83. Id.
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An independent expert concluded that the "[tihe Taliban Army... includes
al Qaeda. .. ,4 International society appears to accept the Taliban's
responsibility. Little criticism has been heard against the United States or
United Kingdom for holding the Taliban responsible for the acts of al Qaeda.
On the other hand, the law clearly does not support a standard of
responsibility in a case where a state merely harbored terrorists, and certainly
not in a case where any link to terrorism was in the past or not to the terrorists
who carried out the requisite armed attack. 5 A state commits an act of
aggression if it uses significant force against a state where no evidence has
been found of the commission of on-going terror acts or where the evidence
is insufficient to link the state to the relevant terror acts of a non-state actor. 6
In those cases, as is discussed in Part V, the victim must use responses short
of self-defense or obtain Security Council authorization to do more.
IV. USING ONLY NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONAL FORCE
Once the requisite armed attack occurs and is linked to a responsible
state, the right of self-defense includes taking the defense to the territory of
that state, if necessary to the defense and proportional to the injury
threatened.87 Armed force used in self-defense must be necessary for the
objective of defense, and it must be proportional to the injury threatened.8
The principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction89 form the central
84. Serge Schmemann, U.N. EnvoySaysAll Options are Open on a Post-Taliban Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at B4.
85. These examples are all less substantial links than those required by the authorities in notes
74-77, 81.
86. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 12.
87. Nicaragua, supra note 12, at ' 35-38.
88. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
141. Necessity restricts the use of military force to the attainment of legitimate military objectives.
Proportionality requires that the force needed to attain those military objectives be weighed against possible
civilian casualties. If the loss of innocent life or destruction of property is out-of-proportion to the
importance of the objective, the objective must be abandoned. Proportionality prohibits force "which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which be excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, art. 51, 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. "In the
law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that belligerents
do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy." Judith Gardam,
Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993).
89. Theodor Meron, Comment, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International
Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 240 (1996). Distinction is closely related to proportionality.
It means those not taking part in the fighting may not be deliberately targeted.
[Vol. 63:889
LAWFUL SELF-DEFENSE TO TERRORISM
customary law principles of international humanitarian law.9" Necessity and
proportionality further condition when force may be used in the first place.
Necessity refers to military necessity, and the obligation that force be used
only if necessary to accomplish a reasonable military objective.9 ' According
to Bring:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned,
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose
or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.92
The military objective of self-defense is to repel on-going and future attacks.
Proportionality, which is closely related to necessity, prohibits force "which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."93
Israel's response to terror attacks perpetrated by Palestinians and other
anti-Israeli groups operating out of Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia have been
particularly criticized for their lack of proportionality.9" Israel invaded
Lebanon in 1982 in response to attacks by the Palestine Liberation
Organization. The invasion went as far as the capital, Beirut, far from the area
where attacks on Israel originated. The Israelis remained in Lebanon at that
time for three-and-a-half months. Although the United States felt Israel had
a right of self-defense with regard to the attacks it was suffering, even it felt
Israel's response was out-of-proportion to those attacks.95
90. Meron, supra note 89, at 240. Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal
Bases, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 1, 30-33 (D. Fleck ed., 1995);
W. Michael Reisman & Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law Standards United to
Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 86. 94-95 (1998).
91. Reisman & Stevick, supra note 90, at 94.
92. Ove Bring, International Humanitarian Law After Kosovo: Is Lex Lata Sufficient?, Presentation
at the Legal & Ethical Lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign (Aug. 8-10, 2001) (manuscript on file with
the author) (emphasis added).
93. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), Dec*. 12, 1977, art. 51, 5, 1152
U.N.T.S. 3. "In the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental
principle that belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy." See
also Gardam, supra note 88.
94. See Hufford & Malley, supra note 78, at 155-60; see also GRAY, supra note 80, at 116; Gregory
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When Kuwait was liberated, the coalition forces did not go all the way to
Baghdad and did not eliminate the regime of Saddam Hussein. They liberated
Kuwait and provided security for that country in the form of a buffer zone on
the territory of Iraq.96 Operation Enduring Freedom properly aimed at
eliminating the military capacity of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Leaders of
either group could be apprehended and brought to justice in the United States
or elsewhere. Eliminating the whole government structure created by the
Taliban, as a war aim was beyond necessary self-defense. Attacking other
states is wholly unjustifiable.
Enduring Freedom began consistently with the principles of necessity and
proportionality. Secretary Powell indicated that the U.S. would not aim to
eliminate the Taliban entirely.97 Events seemed to have overtaken the United
States, however, when suddenly the Northern Alliance continued to Kabul and
completely routed the Taliban from power. Judging from Powell's
indications, the U.S. apparently did not intend this, and thus it may not be
responsible for a disproportionate use of force. Nevertheless, several
governments, including Afghanistan's new interim government, criticized the
United States for continuing to bomb after the Taliban fell in December 2001.
Continuing to use that amount and type of force may have exceeded both
necessity and proportionality. The shift to more ground troops starting in
January to respond to al Qaeda fighters in the Afghan hills was arguably
closer to the necessity and proportionality standards, though bombing
continued, with tragic consequences.98
V. ALTERNATIVES TO SELF-DEFENSE
Where the conditions for self-defense are not met, a state has three
options: it can seek Security Council authorization for the use of force; it can
employ coercive countermeasures; or it can engage in cooperative policing.99
96. See O'Connell, supra note 25.
97. Pamela Constable, U.S. Hopes To Attract Moderates in Taliban; Powell Sees Them in 'New
Afghanistan', WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2001, at A24; see Sally Buzbee, Afghan Future Shapes Current
Action, AP ONLINE, Oct. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28751614.
98. David Usbome, UN Raps U.S. Military After Afghan Wedding Deaths "Cover Up,"
INDEPENDENT, July 30, 2002, at 9.
99. For a description of the modalities of an international police action, see Jost Delbriick, The Fight
Against Global Terrorism: Self-Defense or Collective Security as International Police Action? Some
Comments on International Legal Implications of the "WarAgainst Terrorism, "44 GER. YBK INT'L L. 9,
19-24 (2001).
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The Security Council may authorize the use of armed force and lesser
measures by a state when the Council finds a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression.'"° The Council may respond with force to a
broader range of violence than may states acting in self-defense because it
may respond to mere threats, and not just armed attacks. Again, the force
authorized must be necessary, proportional and discriminatory in the
circumstances.' In two cases where the Security Council sought the
extradition of wanted terrorists, it imposed economic sanctions rather than
authorizing the use of force or forceful apprehension of persons. °2 The
Security Council has also found the September 11 attacks to be a threat to
international peace and security. It has called on "all States to work together
urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these
terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held
accountable."'0 3 It calls on the international community to cooperate to
suppress terrorism. It could call on all states to use force, even against states
only threatening terror. "
Where the right of self-defense against a state is not triggered and where
the Security Council does not act, the first alternative for a victim of terror is
the domestic criminal justice system of states."0 5 Individuals and groups
carrying out attacks without the sponsorship of a state are common criminals.
They clearly fall under the jurisdiction of the state on whose territory they are
found: IRA terrorists in the United States are examples. Territorial states
100. U.N. Charter, art. 39.
101. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Debating the Law of Sanctions, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 63, 71-72
(2002).
102. The Security Council demanded that the Taliban hand Osama bin Laden over to a country where
he was under indictment in Resolution 1267, 2 (1999). In Resolution 1333 (2000) it further refined and
strengthened the sanctions imposed in 1267. The Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya until it
extradited two persons wanted for the bombing of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland. See S.C.
Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 3033rd mtg. 1992, S.C. Res. 748 U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg. (1992); see also
Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.) 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14) (Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures).
103. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373, supra note 20.
104. U.N. Charter, arts. 39, 42.
105. On the rules of jurisdiction in international cases, see JURISDICTION, LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw (W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999).
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have an obligation to extradite or try individuals accused of terrorism. 6
Trials must be fair and credible.
Failure to fulfill obligations in international law, including obligations to
try or extradite accused terrorists, may give rise to the right to take
countermeasures. Countermeasures are also the option for a state responding
to another state's use of violence or even armed force, if the act is a single
incident, rather than an on-going series. In such a case, a state may use
countermeasures until the wrongdoer ceases the wrong and provides a
remedy.'0 7 Appropriate remedies can include compensation and assurances
of non-repetition.
Countermeasures are actions which violate the law but are taken in
response to prior violations.'0 8 Countermeasures must be proportional to the
injury suffered and are available only if the parties involved have no explicit
commitment to use alternative means of dispute settlement. °9 Certain
measures are prohibited, in particular, armed force and violations of human
rights or diplomatic immunity. Countermeasures may be taken by the injured
states, but in the case of universal jurisdiction crimes, it may be lawful for any
state to take measures."' The attacks of September 11 involved the
intentional killing of so many innocent people that they qualify as crimes
against humanity, which are universal jurisdiction crimes."' Any state's
courts should be able to exercise judicial jurisdiction over persons accused of
106. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. 565; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONVENTIONS (1998), available at
http://state.gov/www/global/terrorisml.
107. See Responsibility of States, supra note 74.
108. Concerning the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1998 I.C.J. 1; Concerning the
Air Services Agreement (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416,1 83 (1978); see also Responsibility of States, supra
note 74, arts. 49-54; Karl Doehring. The Unilateral Enforcement of International Law by Exercising
Reprisals, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 235-36 (Ronald St. John Macdonald ed., 1994);
ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES (1984).
109. Responsibility of States. supra note 74, at 50.
110. Id. at arts. 40-41.
I 11. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, ASIL
INSIGHTS, available at www.asil.org (citing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court definition
of a crime against humanity: "widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack"); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.
183/9 (1998). reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
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universal jurisdiction crimes." 2  Any state may arguably aid in the
enforcement of the law prohibiting such crimes by taking countermeasures.
Though the most common form of countermeasure is economic sanctions,
forceful action short of armed force also fits the definition of lawful
countermeasure. For example, a state may be able to send agents to apprehend
terrorists from another state that refuses to extradite or try them." 3 A police
action or incursion is short of armed force and is arguably proportional to the
wrong of harboring terrorists. Support for this interpretation of the law is
limited, however. We have examples of police actions and the like on state
territory or areas beyond national jurisdiction which states treat as not
amounting to prohibited armed force." 4 These police actions are better
classified as de minimis uses of force. The best known case is the "volunteer"
action to kidnap Eichmann from Argentina on behalf of Israel. The action was
condemned." 5 Yet it occurred before the development of the "try or
112. E.g., Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L REV. 785
(1988).
113. In October 1985, the U.S. apprehended an Egyptian plane carrying the terrorist hijackers of the
ship Achille Lauro, forcing the plane down at a NATO base in Italy without Italy's consent. Malvina
Halberstam, Antonio Cassese' s Terrorism, Politics, and the Law: The Achille Lauro Affair, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 410 (1991) (book review). See also Jordan Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The
Use of Force Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 711 (1986). But see ANTONIO CASSESE, TERRORISM, POLITICS
AND THE LAW: THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR 127 (1989).
114. States may use minimal armed force to enforce the law without violating Article 2(4). Minimal
use of force on the high seas or in air space over the high seas is permissible. For example, states may use
armed force in affecting arrests by shooting across the bow of a pirate ship on the high seas or dropping a
bomb on an oil tanker in international waters to prevent pollution damage. In 1967, the UK bombed the
Torrey Canyon, an oil tanker which had run aground in international waters and threatened serious oil
pollution damage to the UK coast. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969). The
action was universally approved and codified at Article 216 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature, Dec. 10, 1982, Art.
107, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982), reprinted in United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No.E.83.v.5 (1983), 21 ILM 1261
(1982).
In the Red Crusader incident, a Danish fishing control vessel fired on a British fishing trawler on the
high seas. A Commission of Inquiry found Denmark had used excessive force, but it did not suggest that
Denmark had violated Article 2(4). See Red Crusader Incident, 35 I.LR. 485 (Den.-U.K. 1962); J.G.
MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPuTE SEftLEMENT 43-47 (1994). Spain did suggest this with regard to
Canadian enforcement action against Spanish fishing vessels on the high seas. It alleged that shooting
across the bow was a violation of Article 2(4) in an application to the International Court of Justice. The
case was withdrawn from the Court. Spain did not complain to the Security Council nor have
commentators supported Spain's interpretation of Article 2(4) in the case. See Marvin Soroos, The Turbot
War: Resolution of an International Fishery Dispute, in CONFLICT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 235 (N.P.
Gleditsch ed., 1997); Peter G.G. Davies, The EC/Canadian Fisheries Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic,
44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 927 (1995).
115. LOUiS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw 1083-86 (3d ed. 1993).
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extradite" principle. 16 Israel could not justify its action as a countermeasure
because it was not responding to a prior wrong by Argentina. On the other
hand, no state characterized the kidnapping as a use of armed force or an
otherwise-prohibited measure. The better approach for a state interested in
taking forceful measures on the territory of another state is to seek Security
Council authorization for such an action." 7 Absent such authorization,
however, a state does have alternatives to full-scale self-defense in the light
of a significant terror attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
Operation Enduring Freedom took the fight against terrorism to the
territory of Afghanistan. This was a lawful decision since the United States
had initially been the victim of a significant armed attack and it had clear and
convincing evidence of both planned future attacks and Afghanistan's
responsibility for both past and planned attacks. The most serious question
regarding the legality of Enduring Freedom concerns whether the operation
remained necessary and proportional to America's self-defense after the fall
of the Taliban government. Where states are confronted with attacks that do
not permit armed force in self-defense, they must use a. criminal law
enforcement approach, which can be backed up by countermeasures. These
alternatives to self-defense have much to commend them in a world where
terrorism appears to be part of our future and where the means of armed force
can so often be disproportionate to any injury suffered or threatened.
It appears that proportionality is the concept around which the law of
armed conflict and international criminal law enforcement are coming to
coalesce. 8 September 11 and its aftermath show that the once-clear divisions
between crime and war are breaking down. That fact should not cause a legal
crisis. A state responding to attacks upon it will act lawfully so long as its
response is proportional to the injury suffered or threatened." 9
116. See SCHACHTER, supra note 32, at 163.
117. Plainly, secrecy would be required in such a case. The Security Council can operate in secret
when necessary.
118. For a comprehensive discussion of proportionality, see Enzo Cannizzaro, The Role of
Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 889 (2001).
119. Similarly, the law governing individual accountability whether in war or peace is also merging.
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